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Stockel: Brown v. State of New York

BROWN V. STATE OF NEW YORK: JUDGE
SIMONS SAYS NEW YORK STATE CAN BE
HELD LIABLE FOR MONEY DAMAGES
INTRODUCTION
On the eve of his retirement, Judge Richard Simons, writing
for a 5-1 majority of the New York State Court of Appeals,
announced a landmark opinion' which held that the State of New
York can be liable in money damages for violations of the Equal
Protection and Search and Seizure Clauses of the New York State
2
Constitution.
In 1992, Ricky Brown was a student at the State University of
New York, College at Oneonta [hereinafter "SUNY-O"] when
three police officers stopped him and two friends on Main Street
in the upstate college town after a woman who had been assaulted
near the campus a few days earlier told police that her attacker
was a black man. 3 Within a few days of the attack, the police
began rounding up almost every African-American in Oneonta,
demanding to know where they had been and whether they had
suspicious cuts on their arms. 4 More than four years later, the
New York State Court of Appeals has held that Brown, and
approximately 300 other African-Americans who were stopped
by police during the days of roundups, have a valid cause of
action against the State for violating their state constitutional
rights.
1. See Brown v. State of New York, 89 N.Y.2d 172, 674 N.E.2d 1129.
652 N.Y.S.2d 223 (1996).
2. N.Y. CONST. art I, § 11 (stating in pertinent part that -No person shall
be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision
thereof."); N.Y. CONST. art I, § 12 (stating in pertinent part that "The right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated... but upon
probable cause. .. ").
3. Brown, 89 N.Y.2d at 176, 674 N.E.2d at 1131, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 225.
4. Id.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1997

1

Touro Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 3 [1997], Art. 6

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 13

The lawsuit stems from a September 4, 1992, incident in which
a seventy-seven year-old woman suffered superficial knife
wounds while reportedly struggling with a purported burglar in
her home located approximately five minutes from the Oneonta
campus. 5 When the woman said she could only describe her
assailant as a college-aged black man, state and county police
6
obtained a list of every black man attending the University.
Using the list, which was provided by the University's acting
president, police tracked down each of the men, demanding alibis
7
and insisting on checking their arms for signs of a struggle.
When the list produced no suspects, police began stopping black
men randomly in the streets, eventually questioning almost 300
8
people.
A class action was brought on behalf of all of the questioned
residents. 9 Before submitting their answer, the State moved to
dismiss on the grounds that the plaintiffs had failed to state a
cause of action and that the court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction. 10 The Court of Claims dismissed the suit, claiming
that the State's waiver of sovereign immunity applies only to
traditional common law torts and, therefore, the court lacked
jurisdiction. 11 The court also held that direct actions for state
constitutional violations are not cognizable in any court unless

5.
6.
7.
8.

Id.
Id at 177, 674 N.E.2d at 1131-32. 652 N.Y.S.2d at 225-26.
Id.
Id at 176, 674 N.E.2d at 1131, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 225. In the years

since the search first began, no person has been arrested for the attack. Id.
9. The claim was brought as a class action on behalf of two separate
classes: the first class was comprised of those persons whose names were on
the computer list generated by SUNY-O officials and the second class
consisted of those persons who were stopped and questioned by police officers
without reasonable suspicion. Id. at 177 n.1, 674 N.E.2d at 1132 n.1, 652
N.Y.S.2d at 226 n.l. Only claims involving the second class were being
appealed. Id.

10. Id. at 176. 674 N.E.2d at 1131, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 225.
11. Id.
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they are linked to a traditional tort. The Appellate Division,
12
Third Department, affirmed.
On review, the New York State Court of Appeals held that a

cause of action seeking money damages may be brought against
New York State for violations of Equal Protection and Search
and Seizure Clauses of the New York State Constitution and that

the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims is not limited to causes of
action for traditional common law torts. 13 This note will first
examine the history behind the "constitutional tort" 14 cause of

action. 15 It will then analyze the Court of Appeals' decision in
Brown16 and discuss the implications of such a decision.
I. A "CONSTITUTIONAL TORT" CAUSE OF ACTION
In 1961, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the Civil
Rights Statutes, 17 specifically 42 U.S.C. § 1983,18 could be used

by an individual to recover damages from a state official for

12. Id. See Brown v. State of New York, 221 A.D.2d 681, 633 N.Y.S.2d
409 (3d Dep't 1995).
13. Brown, 89 N.Y.2d at 197, 674 N.E.2d at 1144, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 238.
14. A constitutional tort is "any action for damages for violation of a
constitutional right against a government or individual defendants." Id. at 177.
674 N.E.2d at 1132, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 226. According to the Brown court
"[tlhe term 'constitutional tort' has been attributed to Professor Marshall
Shapo who used it in an article on the subject in the Northwestern University
Law Review 35 years ago. It is now used generally by courts and
commentators." Id. at 177 n.2, 674 N.E.2d at 1132 n.2. 652 N.Y.S.2d at 226
n.2. (citations omitted). See William Burnham, Separating Constitutionaland
Conunon Law Torts: A Critique amd a Proposed ConstitutionalTheory of Dutv.
73 MINN. L. REv. 515, 515 n. 2 (1989).
15. See infra notes 17 - 62 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 63 - 122 and accompanying text.
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1988 (1982).
18. Congress originally enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as part of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, also known as the Ku Klux Klan Act. See Harry
Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protectionof Individual Rights- Will the
Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV 1. 29 (1985).
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deprivation of one's constitutional rights. 19 The Court found a
monetary damages remedy appropriate since section 1983 was
enacted "to aid in the preservation of human liberty and human
rights."' 20 With its decision in Monroe v. Pape,2 1 the Supreme
Court ushered in the era of the 'constitutional tort,' and with it,
the right to obtain monetary relief for the violation of one's
constitutional rights by a state official. However, where one's
constitutional rights were violated by an FBI or INS agent, no
similar cause of action was available since the Civil Rights
22
Statutes did not apply to the actions of a federal official.
It was not until the 1970's that the Supreme Court created a
corollary cause of action for individuals whose constitutional
rights are infringed by an employee of the federal government.
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics,23 the Supreme Court ruled that a federal official could
be held personally liable for damages resulting from violations of
a plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights. The Court found that, in
the absence of any statutory provision providing for such right,
such as section 1983, an aggrieved party could bring suit directly
24
under the Federal Constitution.
The Supreme Court, in Bivens, felt compelled to fill a void left
by Congress in the Civil Rights Statutes. The Court found it
inherently unfair that an individual whose constitutional rights
were violated could be deprived of redress simply by virtue of
the fact that the wrongdoer was a federal rather than state
official. Accordingly, the Court determined that the only way to
19. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-87 (1961).

20. See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 638-39 (1980) (quoting Owen v.
City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 636 (1980)).

21. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
22. See, e.g., Martinez v. Winner, 771 F.2d 424, 441 (10th Cir. 1985)
(stating that federal officials are ordinarily not subject to suit under § 1983):
Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 560 (1lth Cir. 1984) (stating that § 1983
actions do not lie against federal law enforcement officials). A federal official
can be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) if he conspires with a state official to
violate the equal protection rights of a citizen. See United Bhd. of Carpenters
v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 830 (1983).

23. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
24. Id. at 397.
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remedy this inequity was to create a damages cause of action
based upon the United States Constitution itself. In creating such
a remedy, the Court put teeth into the Constitution by ruling that
a violation of one's constitutional rights could produce the same
result as a violation of a common law right, i.e., damages.
A. The History of a "ConstitutionalTort"
For nearly a hundred years, the general view was that the Civil
Rights Statutes, in particular 42 U.S.C. § 1983,25 were limited to
the redress of an unconstitutional action specifically authorized
by a state. 2 6 Constitutional deprivations caused by a local police
officer who conducted an illegal search or the sheriff who
wrongfully placed a person in custody were considered beyond
their official authority and therefore not actionable. The courts
reasoned that, because conduct that went beyond an official's
authority is not "state action," such conduct was not redressable
under section 1983. Therefore, a remedy, if any existed, was to
27
be found under some common law tort.
In the 1940's, the Supreme Court began to alter its view of
'state action.' In two cases in particular, 2 8 the Court broadened
the scope of 'state action' to include any "misuse of power,
possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects. or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within

the jurisdiction on thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party

injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress. For purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable
exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of
the District of Columbia.
Id.
26. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 195, 208-09 (1961) (Frankfurter.
J., dissenting).
27. Id. See Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism. 90
HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1170-75 (1977).
28. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945): United States v.
Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
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the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law. ,,29 As
Justice Blackmun noted, these cases "signaled a general
relaxation of the strict 'state action' requirement that had
shackled the Fourteenth Amendment and its enforcing Civil
Rights Acts since Reconstruction." 30 Although the notion of
'state action' was expanded by these decisions, damage recovery,
in general, was still limited to actions based on the enforcement
31
of official state policy.
It was not until 1961 that the Supreme Court applied its
broader 'state action' definition to a suit for damages under
section 1983. In Monroe v. Pape,32 the Court found that the
victim of an illegal search and detainment could obtain damages
from the arresting officers for their violation of the plaintiff's
Fourth Amendment rights. 33 In applying a definition of 'state
action' which included the routine acts of government, the Court,
by permitting a meaningful affirmative remedy for most
deprivations of one's constitutional rights caused by a state
official, released the handcuffs which had remained on the Civil
Rights Statutes since their inception.
While victims of a state official's act could now rely upon 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for damages, victims of virtually identical acts
committed by federal officials had no similar statutory right to an
action for damages. Section 1983, by its express wording, could
only be applied to actions of persons acting "under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or
Territory or the District of Columbia." 34 There was simply no
law that authorized redress for a constitutional deprivation by a
federal official.
In an effort to remedy this inequitable situation, the Supreme
Court decided Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the

29. Screws, 325 U.S. at 109.
30. See Blackmun, supra note 18, at 17.
31. See, e.g., Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275-77 (1939); Nixon v.
Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 85-87 (1932).

32. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
33. Id. at 187.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see supra note 25.
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Federal Bureau of Narcotics.35 The Court stated that it is "well
settled that where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal
statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion,
federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the
wrong done." 36
B. The Bivens Cause of Action
In Bivens, the Court recognized a cause of action directly under
the Federal Constitution against federal officers acting in their
individual capacity for violations of constitutionally protected
rights. 37 Six federal narcotics agents entered into Webster
Bivens' apartment without a warrant or probable cause. 38 They
arrested Bivens, handcuffed him in front of his wife and children
and searched the entire apartment. 39 Bivens was then booked,
interrogated and strip-searched. 4 0 Eventually, all charges against
him were dropped.
Since all charges were dropped, the usual remedy of excluding
evidence seized in violation of the constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures was unavailable. Bivens sued
the agents in federal district court, seeking damages to
compensate for the humiliation, embarrassment and mental
41
suffering he experienced due to the agents' unlawful conduct.
The government argued that Bivens had no cause of action for
damages based solely on the United States Constitution, and since
Congress had not established a federal cause of action for
damages arising from an unreasonable search or seizure, Bivens'
only remedies would be as provided in state tort law. 42 The

35. 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971)

36. Id. at 396 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
37. Id. at 394-95.
38. Id. at 389.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 389-90.

42. Id. at 390-91. In his complaint, Bivens claimed that he suffered "great
humiliation, embarrassment, and mental suffering as a result of the agents'
unlawful conduct, and sought $15,000 damages from each of them." Id.
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Supreme Court disagreed and held that Bivens was entitled to sue
for damages.43
Bivens sued directly under the United States Constitution for
money damages arising from the illegal search and seizure by
federal narcotics officers. Lacking any statutory basis for such an
award, the Court inferred, from the text of the Federal
Constitution, a right to obtain relief for the deprivation of one's
Fourth Amendment rights by a federal official. The Court noted
that "where federally protected rights have been invaded, it has
been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust
44
their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief."
The Court recognized that the constitutional right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures was enforceable by the
judiciary without Congressional action such as an enabling
statute. 45 The Court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution provides an example where the
constitutional provision establishes the right, obligation, or
principle without legislative action. 4 6 Justice Brennan, writing
for the Court, found that "[h]istorically, damages have been
regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal
47
interests in liberty.,,
In his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan stressed that, because
Bivens could not obtain prospective relief and because sovereign
immunity precluded relief against the federal government, "[f]or
people in Bivens' shoes," it is a damage claim against the
48
individual officers "or nothing."
While the Bivens decision has been described by numerous
critics as a prime example of judicial activism and overreaching,
a Bivens cause of action continues to exist in the absence of any
statute authorizing it. 4 9 Subsequently, courts have extended the
43. Id. at 397.
44. Id. at 392 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
45. Id. at 394-95.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 395.

48. Id. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring).
49. The criticism started with the dissenting opinions in the Bivens
decision. The dissenting Justices argued that the majority's holding infringed
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right to obtain damages from a federal official for a constitutional
violation from the Fourth Amendment violation present in Bivens
to the right to seek damages for violation of the First, 50 Fifth, 5 1
Sixth 52 and Eighth 53 Amendments.
Indeed, courts have
generally viewed Bivens actions as applying to the full panoply of
54
rights contained in the Federal Constitution.
Seemingly, the Bivens decision put constitutional violations by
a federal official on par with those committed by state officials by
creating a right for an individual like Webster Bivens to obtain
meaningful redress for the deprivation of his constitutional rights
55
through a suit for damages.
upon the legislative function of Congress. Id. at 421-22 (Burger, J..
dissenting); 1d. at 427-30 (Black, J., dissenting). Compare Thomas S. Schrock
& Robert C. Welsh, Reconsidering the ConstitutionalConunon Law, 91 HARV.
L. REV. 1117, 1135-38 (1978) (stating that Bivens is a constitutional decision
because it prevents the Fourth Amendment from being rendered a "mere form
of words") with Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: ConstitutionalCommon Law,
89 HARV. L. REv. 1, 23-24 (1975) (stating that Bivens is a common-law
decision in keeping with "the long federal common law practice of articulating
the remedial implications of federal statutory rights").
50. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (holding that
government officials may be liable for damages when performance of
discretionary duties clearly violate known statutory or constitutional rights).
51. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 249 (1979).
52. See Wounded Knee Legal Defense/Offense Comm. v. FBI, 507 F.2d
1281, 1284 (8th Cir. 1974).
53. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 17-18 (1980).
54. See Bennett v. Campbell, 564 F.2d 329, 331-32 (9th Cir. 1977).
Causes of actions based upon Bivens have been brought against federal officials
for a myriad of allegedly illegal activities, including wiretapping of other
federal employees. See Halperin v. Kissinger, 807 F.2d 180, 182 (D.C. Cir.
1986). Bivens actions have also been brought for other violations. See, e.g..
Smith v. Nixon, 807 F.2d 197, 199 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (members of the press);
Bryan v. Jones, 530 F.2d 1210, 1212 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 865
(1976) (improper incarceration); Harlow, 457 U.S. at 802 (personnel actions
taken in response to the exercise of first amendment rights) and Carlson, 446
U.S. at 16 (inadequate medical care rising to the level of cruel and unusual
punishment).
55. On remand from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit ruled that there was no immunity for the individual federal
officials. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 456 F.2d 1339, 1347 (2d Cir. 1972). The case was later settled,
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C. State Liabilityfor Constitutional Tort Claims
In general, a "constitutional tort" plaintiff bringing a Section
1983 action for a constitutional violation committed by a state
employee may not recover damages from the state itself. The
Supreme Court has held that, absent a waiver, each of the fifty
state governments has sovereign immunity from constitutional
torts.56 Unlike the immunity which has been applied to the
federal government, immunity for state governments is derived
directly from the United States Constitution under the Eleventh
57
Amendment.
The Supreme Court had determined that, because the Civil
Rights Statutes provided for damages against 'persons,' Congress
did not intend to waive sovereign immunity for constitutional
torts committed by states. 58 Therefore, state governments were
not subject to suits for damages for constitutional torts committed
by state employees. However, the sovereign immunity accorded
states under the Eleventh Amendment is not impenetrable and it

with each defendant paying Mr. Bivens $100. See Hernandez v. Lattimore,
454 F. Supp. 763, 767 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
56. See Quem v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979); Monell v. New York City
Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.54 (1978); Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651 (1974).
57. The Eleventh Amendment provides that "The Judicial power of The
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST.
amend. XI.
58. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979). The Court in Quern stated:
[Section] 1983 does not explicitly and by clear language indicate on its
face an intent to sweep away the immunity of the States; nor does it
have a history which focuses directly on the question of state liability
and which shows that Congress considered and firmly decided to
abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the States.
Id. at 345.
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may be waived by the states or by an act of Congress, at least
59
with regard to matters of federal concern.
With the advent of the modem era of the constitutional tort,
municipalities were initially granted the same sovereign immunity
afforded to states. In Monroe v. Pape, the Supreme Court held
that municipalities, like states, were not "persons" as that term is
used under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 - 1988 and were therefore
protected from suit. 60 However, in 1978, the Court reexamined
the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act and found that
Congress had, in fact, intended the Act to apply to local
governments. 6 1 Since city and local governments are "persons"
under this new interpretation of 42 U.S.C § 1983, they became
subject to money judgments for violating the constitutional rights
of individuals. 62 It is under this framework that the New York
State Court of Appeals reviewed the claims of Ricky Brown and
the other members of the class.

II. THE BROWN V. STATE OF NEW YORK DECISION

In Brown, the New York State Court of Appeals was presented
with two primary issues: (1) whether the Court of Claims had
subject matter jurisdiction over a constitutional tort claim against
the State without either a statute expressly authorizing this type
of claim or a traditional common law tort theory which supported
money damages; and (2) whether the plaintiff's causes of action

59. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
60. 365 U.S. 167, 191-92 (1961).

61. See Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658,
690 (1978). The determination of whether a local government or municipality
has sovereign immunity from a constitutional tort is separate from the question
of whether such entity may assert a defense of qualified immunity from such a
claim. In Owen v. City of Independence, the Supreme Court, addressing this
latter question, ruled that there was no basis for according qualified immunity
to a municipality. 445 U.S. 622, 650 (1980).

62. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690.
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against the State were based upon rights secured to them by the
State Constitution and other State statutes. 63
Noting the United States Supreme Court held, in Monroe, that
a plaintiff can bring suit under section 1983 where his or her
constitutional rights have been violated by a person acting under
color of State law, even where an adequate common law remedy
has been provided by the State, the court of appeals pointed out
that "[t]he statute was intended to create 'a species of tort
liability' in favor of persons deprived of their constitutional
rights." 64 For support, the court looked to a number of other
states which, under state or local laws, have recognized similar
causes of action for constitutional violations. 65 The court also
explained that, even though the Supreme Court has relied upon
common law when determining the scope of liability in cases
involving a Bivens claim, constitutional and common law tort
causes of action are not "coextensive." 6 6 According to the court:
The common law of tort deals with the relation between
individuals by imposing on one a legal obligation for the benefit
of the other and assessing damages for harm occasioned by a
failure to fulfill that obligation ....

Constitutional duties, by

contrast, address a limited number of concerns and a limited set
of relationships. Constitutions assign rights to individuals and
impose duties on the government to regulate the government's
actions to protect them. It is the failure to fulfill a stated
constitutional duty which may support a claim for damages in a
67
constitutional tort action.
63. Brown v. State of New York, 89 N.Y.2d 172, 176, 674 N.E.2d 1129,
1131, 652 N.Y.S.2d 223, 225 (1996).
64. Id. at 178, 674 N.E.2d at 1132, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 226. See Carey v.

Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 253 (1978) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,
417 (1976)).

65. Id. See, e.g., Widgeon v. Eastern Shore Hosp. Ctr., 479 A.2d 921
(Md. 1984); Gay Law Students Assn. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 595 P.2d
592 (Cal. 1979); Phillips v. Youth Dev. Program, 459 N.E.2d 453 (Mass.
1983); Newell v. City of Elgin, 340 N.E.2d 344 (Ill. 1976).
66. Brown, 89 N.Y.2d at 178, 674 N.E.2d at 1132-33, 652 N.Y.S.2d at
226-27.
67. Id. at 178-79, 674 N.E.2d at 1133, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 227 (citations
omitted).
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Brown was brought as a class action asserting claims under
both the New York State Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, a
federal civil fights statute. 68 The first issue the court had to
address was whether the Court of claims had jurisdiction to hear
a constitutional tort claim. The court began by recognizing that,
under common law, a State is generally immune from suit unless
it waives its sovereign immunity. 69 Noting that, in the initial
action, the Court of Claims determined that it did not have
jurisdiction to hear the case, the court of appeals carefully
70
analyzed the history of sovereign immunity in New York State.
After stating that sovereign immunity is an "'outmoded'
holdover of the notion that the King can do no wrong," the court
noted that, under common law, immunity offers a State complete
protection from certain claims unless it has consented to such a

suit. 71 Historically, New York State had "waived immunity and
compensated aggrieved parties for very few claims." 72 Due to
the increasing injustice and inefficiency stemming from this
immunity, the legislature was forced to adjust its procedure for
hearing claims brought against the State. As a result, the court of
73
claims was given jurisdiction to hear these suits.
68. Id. at 176, 674 N.E.2d at 1131, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 225. However, on
appeal, plaintiff's did not state causes of action under section 1981. Id.
69. The court noted that the applicable Constitutional provisions being
questioned in Brown are "contained in article VI, § 9 of the State Constitution.
which continues the Court of Claims and authorizes the Legislature to
determine its jurisdiction, and the Court of Claims Act, which contains the
waiver of immunity and the jurisdictional and procedural provisions necessary
to implement the constitutional section." Id. at 179, 674 N.E.2d at 1133, 652
N.Y.S.2d at 227.
70. The Court of Claims rejected the jurisdictional argument on the
grounds that the applicable statutes were not expansive enough to imply a
waiver of the State's immunity from constitutional tort claims. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. See CT. CL. ACT § (9)(2) (stating, in pertinent part, that the court
has jurisdiction "[tlo hear and determine a claim of any person, corporation or
municipality against the state for the appropriation of any real or personal
property or any interest therein, for the breach of contract, express or implied.
or for the torts of its officers or employees while acting as such officers or
employees....").
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Furthermore, in Smith v. State of New York, 74 the New York
State Court of Appeals stated that "the jurisdiction of the Court
of claims is to be construed broadly and waiver of immunity

narrowly."

75

The Smith court, in granting jurisdiction, stated

that the court of claims' jurisdiction was of the "broadest
character." ' 76 However, it agreed with the lower court holding

and concluded that, although the State had waived its immunity
from suit, it had not waived its immunity from liability and,
therefore, dismissed the suit. 77 Finding that the Smith ruling
went against public policy, 78 the State legislature amended the

Court of Claims Act in an effort to "extend[], supplement[] and
enlarge[] the waiver to remove the defense of sovereign immunity

79
for tort actions."
In Brown, the State argued that the Court of Claims lacked
jurisdiction to hear either claim because the State's waiver of
sovereign immunity was limited to traditional common law

torts. 80 The court of appeals disagreed and held that the Court of
Claims' statutory jurisdiction to hear claims against the State "for

74. 227 N.Y. 405, 125 N.E. 841, 841, reh'g denied, 229 N.Y. 571, 129
N.E. 918 (1920).
75. Id. at 409-10, 125 N.E. at 841. In Snith, the plaintiff was seeking
damages from the State for injuries suffered due to the State's negligence. Id.
at 407-08, 125 N.E. at 841.
76. Id. at 409, 125 N.E. at 842.
77. Id. at 410, 125 N.E. at 842 ("The immunity of the state from liability
for ... [torts] is not waived by a statute conferring jurisdiction only.").
78. The Brown court characterized this policy as "reduc[ing] rather than
increase[ing] the obstacles to recovery of damages, whether defendant is a
private person or a public body." Brown v. State of New York, 89 N.Y.2d
172, 180, 674 N.E.2d 1129, 1134, 652 N.Y.S.2d 223, 228 (1996).
79. Id. See Jackson v. State of New York, 261 N.Y. 134, 138, 184 N.E.
735, 736, reh'g denied, 261 N.Y. 637, 185 N.E. 771 (1933). Section eight of
the current Court of Claims Act provides "[t]he state hereby waives its
immunity from liability and action and hereby assumes liability and consents to
have the same determined in accordance with the same rules of law as applied
to actions in the supreme court against individuals or corporations ....
" CT.
CL. ACT § (8).
80. Brown, 89 N.Y.2d at 181, 674 N.E.2d at 1134, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 228.
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the torts of its officers and employees" covered the claims
asserted here.81
In light of the lack of an established definition of the word
"tort," the court felt that it was more probable that the legislature
used the word generally to indicate a branch of law that would be
"subject to expansion as new wrongs supporting liability were
recognized." 82 Furthermore, the court found evidence that this
interpretation of the court of claims' jurisdiction has been
recognized in the past.83
The State also argued that, under the Court of Claims Act, the
State's consent to be sued was "limited to liability actions similar
to those which may be brought in the Supreme Court against
individuals and corporations." 84 The court was of the view,
however, that the constitutional tort claims asserted here were
sufficiently similar to claims that could be asserted against
individuals and corporations in state supreme court. 85 The court
explained that there are sections of the constitution which are
applicable to the actions of private parties and cited the Article I,
§ 11 prohibition against discrimination as an example. 86 Thus,
where a constitutional provision is applicable to a private party, it
87
could be enforced in state supreme court to recover damages.

81. Id. at 182, 674 N.E.2d at 1135, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 229.
82. Id. The Brown court noted that "the word tort has no established
meaning in the law. Broadly speaking, a tort is a civil wrong other than a
breach of contract. There are no fixed categories of torts, however, and no
restrictive definitions of the term." Id. at 181. 674 N.E.2d at 1134. 652
N.Y.S.2d at 228.
83. Id. See Vaughan v. State of New York, 272 N.Y. 102. 5 N.E.2d 53
(1936), appeal dismissed, 300 U.S. 638 (1937); Brenon v. State of New York.
31 A.D.2d 776, 297 N.Y.S.2d 88 (4th Dep't 1969).
84. Brown, 89 N.Y.2d at 182, 674 N.E.2d at 1135, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 229.
According to the court, the State claimed that individuals and corporations
could not be sued for violations of the State Constitution. Id.
85. Id. at 183, 674 N.E.2d at 1135, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 229.
86. Id. Article 1, § 11 prohibits discrimination by any "person or by any
firm, corporation, or institution, or by the state." N.Y. CONST. art I, § 11.
87. Brown, 89 N.Y.2d at 183, 674 N.E.2d at 1135, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 229.
However, the court noted that an action based on Article I,§ I1 required
enabling legislation "before the action could be maintained because the
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The court concluded that:
since the causes of action asserted by claimants are sufficiently
similar to claims which may be asserted by individuals and
corporations in Supreme Court to satisfy the statutory
requirement .... the Court's jurisdiction is not limited to
common-law tort causes of action and that damage claims against
the State based upon violations of the State Constitution come
88
within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims.

Having established jurisdiction, the court turned to the legal
sufficiency of the causes of action. The court concluded that the
plaintiff's first five causes of action, 89 which were based on
violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981,90 should be dismissed for failure
to state causes of action. 9 1

provision was not self-executing." Id. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 297(9)
(McKinney 1986); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 40-d (McKinney 1986).
88. Brown, 89 N.Y.2d at 183, 674 N.E.2d at 1136, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 230.
89. Plaintiffs first five causes of action were as follows:
Claim 1--Racially motivated violation of Fourth Amendment of United
States Constitution, thereby violating 42 U.S.C. § 1981; Claim 2-Racially motivated violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution based on
Fourth Amendment violations, thereby violating 42 U.S.C. § 1981;
Claim 3--Racially motivated violation of the New York State
Constitution, article I, § 12 and New York Civil Rights Law § 8,
thereby violating 42 U.S.C. § 1981; Claim 4--Racially motivated
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution based upon violations of article 1, § 12
of the New York State Constitution, thereby violating 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981; Claim 5--Racially motivated violation of article I, § 11 of the
New York Constitution and New York Civil Rights Law § 40-c, thereby
violating 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
Id. at 184 n.4, 674 N.E.2d at 1136 n.4, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 230 n.4.
90. Section 1981 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts,
to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is
enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment,
pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no
other ....

(c) The rights protected by this section are protected against
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The court further concluded that the federal statutory claim was
insufficient because, according to the United States Supreme
Court decision in Jett v. Dallas Independent School District,92 a

§ 1981 claim must be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.93 In
Jett, the Supreme Court concluded that § 1983 may not be used
against a state because a state is not a person for purposes of that
statute. 94
In Brown, plaintiff's had argued that the Civil Rights Act of
1991 was intended to overturn the Jett decision and permit a
claim against the State directly under § 1981. 95 The New York
Court of Appeals disagreed and concluded that the there is no
direct evidence indicating that Congress intended the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 to overturn Jett.96 In fact, the court felt that the Act
was intended to codify the Supreme Court's ruling in Runyon v.
McCrary,97 where the Court held that private parties could be
found liable under § 1981.
The court of appeals then turned to the central substantive
question of whether a private damage action exists under the New
York State Constitution for harm caused by a violation of its
Equal Protection and Search and Seizure clauses. For a civil
damage remedy to be implied, the constitutional provisions in
question must be self-executing 98 and the substantive right must

impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under
color of State law.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
91. Brown, 89 N.Y.2d at 184, 674 N.E.2d at 1136, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 230.
92. 491 U.S. 701 (1989).
93. Brown, 89 N.Y.2d at 185, 674 N.E.2d at 1137, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 231.
94. Jett, 491 U.S. at 731.
95. Brown, 89 N.Y.2d at 185, 674 N.E.2d at 1137, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 231.
96. Id.
97. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
98. Brown, 89 N.Y.2d at 186, 674 N.E.2d at 1137, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 231
("A civil damage remedy cannot be implied for a violation of the State
constitutional provision unless the provision is self-executing, that is. it takes
effect immediately, without the necessity for supplementary or enabling
legislation.").
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be firmly established. 99 The court concluded that these
conditions were met in Brown.
The court noted that there are four possible ways to imply a
cause of action for damages: "(1) the reasoning contained in the
Restatement [Second] of Torts § 874A, (2) analogy to a Bivens
action, (3) common-law antecedents of the constitutional
provision at issue, or [(4)] a combination of all three." 100
In Brown, the New York State Court of Appeals' chief reliance
falls on the Bivens analysis, which, the court observes, is
consistent with rules that govern the implication of private rights
of action generally. 10 1 The court found that certain provisions of
the New York State Constitution are "preemptively selfexecuting" because the "Constitution is a source of positive law,
not merely a set of limitations on governent." 102 According to
the court of appeals, constitutional guarantees are "worthy of
protection on their own terms without being linked to some
common law or statutory tort" and "the courts have an obligation
to enforce these rights by ensuring that each individual receives
103
an adequate remedy for violation of a constitutional duty."
The court stated that legal protection against discrimination and
unreasonable searches and seizures is historically well rooted in
common law antecedents. 104 In support of the plaintiff's claims,
the court observed that Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, before being adopted by Congress, was heavily
99. Id. at 186-87, 674 N.E.2d at 1138, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 232 ("The
violation of a self-executing provision in the Constitution will not always
[tihe substantive right may be
support a claim for damages, however ....
firmly established . . . ") (citations omitted).
100. Id. at 187, 674 N.E.2d at 1138, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 232. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 847A (1977).
101. Brown, 89 N.Y.2d at 187, 674 N.E.2d at 1138, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 232.
102. Id. at 187, 674 N.E.2d at 1137, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 231. More
specifically, the court noted that Article I, § 12 and the Equal Protection
portion of § 11 are self-executing because "[t]hey define judicially enforceable
rights and provide citizens with a basis for judicial relief against the State if
those rights are violated. Actions of State or local officials which violate these
constitutional guarantees are void." Id.
103. Id. at 187, 674 N.E.2d at 1138, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 232.
104. Id. at 188, 674 N.E.2d at 1139, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 233.
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debated and "the prohibition against unlawful searches and
seizures originated in the Magna Carta and has been a part of our
statutory law since 1828."105 In addition, the court pointed to
evidence that the New York State Constitutional Convention of
1938 debate on the exclusionary rule assumed the existence of a
damage action for search and seizure violations. 106
The court determined that the existing remedies for police
fall short and
abuse, namely injunctive and declaratory relief,
that damages are a necessary deterrent.10 7 In Brown, the
claimants had no opportunity to obtain an injunction and no
For these claimants,
ground to enjoin future violations.
according to the court, "it is damages or nothing."108 Moreover,
the Brown court viewed this remedy as being in accordance with
public policy.' 0 9 The court stated that a claimant's right to
recover damages should not be limited to those available under
common-law tort claims and stated that:
[t]o confine claimants to tort causes of action would produce the
paradox that individuals, guilty or innocent, wrongly arrested or
detained may seek a monetary recovery because the complaint
fits within the framework of a common-law tort, whereas these
claimants, who suffered similar indignities, must go remediless
because the duty violated was spelled out in the State
Constitution. 110
Judge Joseph W. Bellacosa dissented. While noting that he
respected "the cogency and reasonableness that is reflected in the
1 he
decision [the majority] reach[ed] in this complicated case," II
argued that it is up to the legislature to decide whether a cause of

105. Id.
106. Id. at 189, 674 N.E.2d at 1139, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 233.
107. Id. at 192, 674 N.E.2d at 1141, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 235.

108. Id.
109. Id. at 191, 674 N.E.2d at 1140, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 234 ("A damage

remedy in favor of those harmed by police abuses is appropriate and in
furtherance of the purpose underlying the sections.").
110. Id. at 191, 674 N.E.2d at 1141, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 235.
111. Id. at 199, 674 N.E.2d at 1146, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 236 (Bellacosa. J.,
dissenting).
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action implied from the state constitution may be asserted against
12
the State. 1
Judge Bellacosa agreed with the State's position that the word
"tort" in the Court of Claims Act is confined to claims that the
enactors of the statute would have understood "as part of the
common-law tradition" 113 and concludes that the "[legislature
has never contemplated that the common law word 'tort' to
include the kind of extensive constitutional domain advanced
here." 114 However, given his view of the proper meaning of the
word 'tort,' Judge Bellacosa would allow 'constitutional tort'type claims when they share a "recognized common law lineage"
with tort claims such as assault, false arrest and trespass. 1 15
Judge Simons' opinion for the court of appeals responds to a
number of these concerns, including Judge Bellacosa's argument
that there is no deterrence of wrongdoing by imposing liability on
the state since the state officials who committed the violations
retain their individual liability. 116 In response, Judge Simons, on
behalf of the majority, argued that, as a result of being held liable
in damages, the state will be encouraged to "avoid such
misconduct by adequate training and supervision and avoid its
repetition by discharging or disciplining negligent or incompetent
117
employees."
In addition, Judge Bellacosa argued that the creation of a civil
remedy intrudes on the powers of the legislature and exposes the
state to tremendous liability. 118 Judge Bellacosa was concerned
that "[t]he exposure includes the stigma of societal fault and the
payment of unknown sums of public funds, not only for this case
112. Id. (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 201, 674 N.E.2d at 1146, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 240 (Bellacosa,
dissenting).
114. Id. at 203, 674 N.E.2d at 1148, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 242 (Bellacosa,
dissenting).
115. Id. at 207, 674 N.E.2d at 1150, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 244 (Bellacosa,
dissenting).
116. Id. at 194, 674 N.E.2d at 1142, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 236.
117. Id. at 194, 674 N.E.2d at 1142-43, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 236-37.
118. Id. at 198, 674 N.E.2d at 1145, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 239 (Bellacosa,
dissenting).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol13/iss3/6

J.,
J.,
J.,

J.,

20

1997]

Stockel:
Brown v.
State of New York 673
YORK
OFNEW
BROWN v. STATE

but also for innumerable others certain to be improvised within
its precedential repertoire." 119
In response, Judge Simons stated that the legislature could
overturn the decision by redefining the Court of Claims'
jurisdiction "if it sees fit to do so," but he suggested that would
undermine the constitution itself. 120 Judge Simons summarized
his position by stating:
[t]he point is that no government can sustain itself, much less
flourish, unless it affirms and reinforces the fundamental values
that define it by placing the moral and coercive powers of the
state behind those values. When the law immunizes official
violations of substantive rules because the cost or bother of doing
otherwise is too great, thereby leaving the victims without any
realistic remedy, the integrity of the rules and their underlying
public values are called into serious question. 121
CONCLUSION
Although the effects of Brown are yet to be realized, the New
York State Court of Appeals' decision could have tremendous
implications in the future. Aside from over-turning decades of
lower court rulings, this decision appears to have paved the way
for redress for those citizens whose constitutional rights have
been violated by New York State officials by expanding the
protections of the state constitution. Furthermore, because the
New York State Court of Appeals is one of the most influential
state courts in the nation, this case will, most likely, have a
domino effect that spreads into other jurisdictions.
On one hand, the Brown decision stands for the proposition that
if the state's constitutional protections are to have any meaning,
those whose rights have been violated must have some form of
actions against the state. On the other hand, the decision has the
potential of opening the floodgates to litigation on numerous

119. Id.
120. Id. at 196, 674 N.E.2d at 1144, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 238.
121. Id.
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claims against the state and, in the event of a damages award for
the plaintiff, the possibility of draining the state treasury.
Although the actual impact of the Brown decisions remains to
be seen, one widely recognized authority on constitutional law
observed, "[d]espite the numerous issues that will have to be
resolved, Brown is a vital precedent. It is the state constitutional
counterpart to § 1983 and Bivens, filling a substantial remedial
vacuum. Brown adds teeth to state constitutional rights and, in
doing so, furthers the rule of law."' 122 Regardless of whether
Brown has given "teeth" to state constitutional rights, it is clear
that the New York State Court of Appeals has cleared the way
for a new era by holding the state government and its agencies
liable for violations of state constitutional rights.
Eric J. Stockel

122. Martin A. Schwartz, Recognizing Damage Suits Under New York
Constitution, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 18, 1997, at 9.
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